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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON THE DECISIONAL
POWERS OF COURTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES IN MARYLAND
EDWARD A. ToMLINSON*
The accommodation of administrative agencies to the tripartite
model of government has proved a difficult theoretical task for federal
and state courts. How does one reconcile the rate-making and licens-
ing responsibilities of an administrative agency such as the Maryland
State Insurance Department with the traditional separation of govern-
mental powers into legislative, executive and judicial departments?
Should not such agencies located within the executive branch of govern-
ment be limited to executive or prosecutorial roles and leave the law-
making to the legislature and the adjudication of cases to the courts?
How does one justify the existence of an administrative process de-
fined to include "those law-making and law-deciding powers which
are exercised not by the legislature or the traditional courts, but by
organs of government classified in our scheme as 'executive.' "-
The initial response of practitioners and judges to administrative
agencies that enjoyed rule-making or adjudicatory powers was often
hostile, but legislators evidently viewed matters differently and, through
legislative initiative, administrative agencies continued to proliferate.
The administrative agency in Maryland finally received an authoritative
judicial seal of approval in State Insurance Commissioner v. National
Bureau of Casualty Underwriters,2 where Chief Judge Hammond
wrote for the court:
The early fears of the bar and bench have largely disappeared
with experience. It became apparent that the complex problems
of modern social, economic and industrial life for ever-increasing
numbers of knowledgeable people could be solved or settled more
expeditiously, effectively, cheaply and simply by administrative
processes than by the traditional executive, legislative and judicial
processes, because the blending of powers in one agency, which
operates in its particular field or specialty continuously over the
years and produces an expertise and a superior ability both cor-
rectly to evaluate specialized questions and to supply correct
answers to these questions - often due largely to the staff of
permanent, expert employees who serve under the successive heads
of the agencies; and secondly, it was recognized that the dangers
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland. A.B., 1961, Princeton University;
M.A., 1962, University of Washington; LL.B., 1965, Harvard University.
1. L. JAFFE & N. NATHANSON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATRIALS 12
(3d ed. 1968).
2. 248 Md. 292, 236 A.2d 282 (1967).
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inherent in government by administrative bodies lie not in the
blending of powers in a single body but in permitting that body's
power to be beyond check or review.3
This judicial recognition of the appropriateness of the administrative
process does not leave administrative agencies free of all constraints.
Quite to the contrary, Chief Judge Hammond in Insurance Commis-
sioner emphasized the "principle of check" by which courts "restrain
improper exercises of administrative powers whether judicial or legis-
lative in nature." 4
The primary issue in Maryland administrative law has there-
fore become the relative roles of administrative agencies and of the
judiciary.5 While the availability and scope of judicial review of
administrative action determines in large part the relationship between
courts and agencies, a study of the relative roles of courts and agencies
must do more than survey the present law of judicial review. It must
also consider the more basic question of the allocation of decision-
making competence. Are there disputes (e.g., medical malpractice
claims) that are so judicial in nature that their resolution cannot be
entrusted to administrative agencies subject only to the check of judicial
review? Conversely, are there questions (e.g., the propriety of issuing
a license) that are so administrative in nature that their resolution
cannot be entrusted to the judiciary?
The answers to these questions have varied over time. One of
the most important of the early regulatory statutes enacted by the
Maryland General Assembly directed the justices of the circuit courts
to license public ferries and "to ascertain in current money the prices
of ferriage for passengers and horses, and the several kinds of carriages
(not allowing anything for the baggage of passengers) at every ferry
by them licensed." ' The justices were also instructed to determine
3. Id. at 299, 236 A.2d at 286.
4. Id. at 300, 236 A.2d at 286.
5. The formal distinction between a "court" and an "agency" derives from
article IV, section 1 of the Maryland Constitution, which provides:
The Judicial power of this State shall be vested in a Court of Appeals, and
such intermediate courts of appeal, as shall be provided by law by the General
Assembly, Circuit Courts, Orphans' Courts, such Courts for the City of Baltimore,
as are hereinafter provided for, and a District Court; all said Courts shall be
Courts of Record, and each shall have a seal to be used in the authentication of all
process issuing therefrom.
This enumeration of the courts of this state is exclusive, and other bodies exercising
fact-finding or adjudicatory powers are by constitutional necessity defined as executive
or administrative agencies. The Maryland Tax Court, therefore, is an administrative
agency and not a court. Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisor of Assessments, 276 Md. 36, 343
A.2d 521 (1975).
6. An Act to Regulate Public Ferries, Ch. 22, [1781] Md. Laws 432 (1 Maxcy).
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how many and what kind of boats were to be kept by each licensed
ferry and what number of able-bodied and skillful hands were to be
employed to operate them. While the constitutionality of this law was
never sustained by any court (evidently because it was never chal-
lenged judicially), the legislature was not troubled by this assignment
of seemingly regulatory or administrative tasks to a court. The legis-
lature saw no conflict between this statute and the separation of powers
provision in the recently adopted Maryland Constitution of 1776.
Article 6 in the Declaration of Rights to that constitution7 provided:
"[t]hat the Legislative, Executive and Judicial powers of government,
ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other." The
General Assembly nevertheless continued in effect its Act for the
judicial regulation of public ferries until 1860.
In two recent cases, the Maryland Court of Appeals has dealt
with the constitutional limits on the administrative and the judicial
process. In County Council v. Investors Funding Corp.," the court
upheld in large part the constitutionality of the Montgomery County
Fair Landlord-Tenant Relations Act which delegated to an adminis-
trative agency the adjudication of disputes between landlords and
tenants. In Department of Natural Resources v. Linchester Sand &
Gravel Corp.,9 on the other hand, the court declared unconstitutional
a statute which required a de novo trial on a landowner's appeal from
the Department of Natural Resources' denial of a permit to fill private
wetlands. The statute was held to be beyond the legislature's power
to enact because it required the court to perform a non-judicial or
administrative function. The ramifications of these two recent cases
on the broader question of the proper allocation of decision-making
competence between courts and agencies form the principal focus
of this article.
THE LAW OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN MARYLAND
The federal law of judicial review of administrative action has
been shaped largely by the federal Administrative Procedure Act
enacted by Congress in 1946.1" The judicial review provisions in that
7. Now article 8, Maryland Declaration of Rights. The present text contains an
additional provision that "no person exercising the functions of one of said Depart-
ments shall assume or discharge the duties of any other."
8. 270 Md. 403, 312 A.2d 225 (1973).
9. 274 Md. 211, 334 A.2d 514 (1975).
10. Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), as amended, 80 Stat. 378
(1966), 81 Stat. 54 (1967), 88 Stat 1561 (1974) (codified in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C.).
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Act"' apply to almost all federal agencies. Section 70612 on the scope
of judicial review establishes six grounds for a court's holding un-
lawful or setting aside agency action'" which are uniformly applicable
except to the extent that (1) statutes preclude judicial review; or
(2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law."4 These
two exceptions permit Congress (subject only to constitutional restric-
tions) to limit or preclude the judicial review otherwise available
under section 706. Both exceptions have been narrowly construed by
the Supreme Court to require Congress to speak in the clearest terms
if it wishes to insulate agency action from the normal judicial review.'
Congress is likewise free to expand for specific agency actions the
scope of judicial review otherwise available under section 706 by
enacting special statutory review procedures.' 6 That section has never-
theless formed the basis for a reasonably uniform and coherent body
of federal law on judicial review of administrative action. Under the
prevailing approach the role of the reviewing court is a limited one.
11. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1970).
12. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970).
13. § 706. Scope of review
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency
action. The reviewing court shall-
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
found to be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or
short of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections
556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of
an agency hearing provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject
to trial de novo by the reviewing court.
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole
record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the
rule of prejudicial error.
5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970).
14. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (a) (1)-(2) (1970).
15. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971)
(discretionary exception); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967)
(statutory preclusion).
16. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2022(c) (1970), which provides that judicial review
of administrative disqualification from the food stamp program shall consist of "a trial
de novo by the court in which the court shall determine the validity of the questioned
administrative action in issue." (emphasis added).
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The court does not substitute its own judgment for that of the agency.
It ascertains instead whether the agency took a hard look at the prob-
lem and engaged in reasoned decision-making; if the administrative
action passes this test, then the court must affirm regardless of how
it would have decided the case had it originally been presented to
the court.
The situation in Maryland is not so clear. In 1957 Maryland
enacted its own Administrative Procedure Act 18 based on the Model
State Administrative Procedure Act approved in 1946 by the American
Bar Association and the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws. Section 255 of the Act on judicial review speci-
fies in subsection (g)1" eight distinct grounds for judicial review of
agency decisions that are roughly comparable to the six grounds speci-
fied in the federal statute. This section has not had the same unifying
effect on the law of judicial review as has its federal counterpart. First,
eight of the more important state agencies have been specifically
exempted from the definition of "agency" in section 244(a) and are
therefore not subject at all to the provisions of the State Administra-
tive Procedure Act.2" The judicial review provisions in section 255
therefore do not apply to those agencies, which have their own statutes
17. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(Leventhal, J.).
18. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, §§ 244-256A (1971).
19. § 255 [Contested cases] - Judicial Review.
(g) Affirmance, remand, reversal or modification of decision. -
The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further
proceedings; or it may reverse or modify the decision if the substantial rights of
the petitioners may have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, infer-
ences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(1) In violation of constitutional provisions; or
(2) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency; or
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure; or
(4) Affected by other error of law; or
(5) Unsupported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in view of
the entire record as submitted; or
(6) Against the weight of competent, material and substantial evidence in
view of the entire record, as submitted by the agency and including de
novo evidence taken in open court; or
(7) Unsupported by the entire record, as submitted by the agency and includ-
ing de novo evidence taken in open court; or
(8) Arbitrary or capricious.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 255(g) (1971).
20. The agencies specifically excluded are: the Board of Parole, the Department
of Parole and Probation, the Workmen's Compensation Commission, the State Acci-
dent Fund, the State Insurance Department of Maryland, the Public Service Commis-
sion, the Employment Security Board and the State Tax Commission. MD. ANN.
CoDE art. 41, § 244(a) (Supp. 1975).
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and case law on the availability and scope of judicial review. Second,
county and municipal agencies are not covered by this Act; judicial
review of their decisions therefore does not take place under section
255.21 Finally, the Maryland legislature on numerous occasions has
enacted special provisions for judicial review of agency action that
supplant and are often inconsistent with the provisions in section 255.
These special provisions generally require some form of heightened
or de novo review of administrative action 2 and can only be under-
stood as a legislative expression of distrust of administrators.
The Maryland Court of Appeals has nevertheless striven mightily
to achieve a uniform approach to judicial review of administrative
action. The hallmark of this approach has been that a reviewing court
should not "itself make independent findings of fact or substitute its
judgment for that of the agency."2 State Insurance Commissioner v.
National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters, where the court articu-
lated this approach, involved a challenge to agency fact-finding on
the validity of rate increases filed with the agency by insurance com-
panies. The court identified the various tests for judicial review of
agency fact-finding contained in section 2 55 (g) of the Administrative
Procedure Act, in other statutes, and in the case law governing judicial
review in the absence of statute. Those tests required alternatively
that the reviewing court uphold the agency's factual findings if sup-
ported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole,24 if not clearly
erroneous or if fairly debatable (applicable to judicial review of zoning
decisions), or if supported by the weight or preponderance of the
evidence on the entire record. 26 The court recognized that there were
differences between the tests but contended the differences "are slight
and under any of the standards the judicial review essentially should
be limited to whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached
the factual conclusion the agency reached. '2 7 The Baltimore City
Court in the Insurance Commissioner case had held unconstitutional
21. Urbana Civic Ass'n v. Urbana Mobile Village, Inc., 260 Md. 458, 272 A.2d
628 (1971).
22. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 161 (H) (e) (1973), which provides that
on appeal from the decision of the Board of Building Savings and Loans Commis-
sioners, the court shall "hear the matter de novo, without a jury .....
23. State Ins. Comm'r v. National Bureau of Cas. Underwriters, 248 Md. 292,
310, 236 A.2d 282, 292 (1967).
24. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 255(g) (5) (1971).
25. See, e.g., American Oil Co. v. Board of Appeals, 270 Md. 301, 310, 310 A.2d
796, 800-01 (1973) ; Board of County Comm'rs v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 235 Md. 151,
161, 200 A.2d 670, 676 (1964); Board of County Comm'rs v. Oak Hill Farms, Inc.,
232 Md. 274, 283, 192 A.2d 761, 766 (1963).
26. MD. ANN. CoDE art. 41, § 255(g) (6) (1971).
27. 248 Md. at 309, 236 A.2d at 292.
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the applicable statutory provision 28 requiring the reviewing court to
find whether the Insurance Commissioner's denial of a rate increase
was supported "by the preponderance of the evidence on consideration
of the record as a whole." The court's decision turned on the fact that
the statute required the reviewing court to weigh the evidence and
substitute its judgment on the facts for that of the agency. The Court
of Appeals interpreted the statute somewhat differently: "The statutory
standard imposed on the court is not to decide whether the Commis-
sioner was right in his factual determinations and inferences but
whether those determinations could reasonably have been made by a
reasoning mind using the preponderance of the evidence test." 9
This interpretation blurs the distinction between substantial evi-
dence and the weight of the evidence since a reference to the "reason-
able" or "reasoning" mind is typical of a narrower substantial evidence
review."° It is nevertheless satisfactory for the court's purposes be-
cause it insures an appropriate level of judicial restraint and saves the
constitutionality of the statute. What remains unclear is why it is not
only inappropriate but also unconstitutional for a court to determine
itself whether or not the facts warrant a rate increase. While the
prescriptive setting of rates and other forms of on-going regulation
of the insurance industry may today be tasks assignable only to an
expert administrative body exercising delegated legislative powers, the
validity of a particular rate increase raises different questions that do
not necessarily involve a court in prospective standard-setting for an
entire industry. Rate filings are submitted to the Commission by in-
dividual insurers or rating organizations.3 1 Passing on the validity
of rate increases involves in large part the determination of adjudica-
tive facts (i.e., facts involving the particular company or companies
seeking the increase) and the application of the statutory standards on
rate filings to those facts. Why are courts not constitutionally com-
petent to do that job if expected to do it by the legislature, just as they
are competent to determine whether a defendant's course of conduct
violates a criminal or civil statute. In the past, disgruntled travellers
or consumers were at times able to challenge in court the reasonable-
ness of charges exacted from them by common carriers and public
utilities.3 2 The accepted wisdom today is that such determinations are
28. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 245(2), now art. 48A, § 242B(2) (Supp. 1974).
29. 248 Md. at 305, 236 A.2d at 289.
30. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938); Inter-
national Ass'n of Machinists, Lodge 35 v. NLRB, 110 F.2d 29, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1939)
(Rutledge, J.); See also Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951).
31. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 242 (1971).
32. See 4 R.C.L. Carriers, § 552 at 1100: Missouri, K.&T. Ry. v. Empire Express
Co., 221 S.W. 590 (Tex., 1920) (courts do not have power to set carrier rates, but
[VOL. 35
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better left to expert regulatory agencies, but the adoption of this
approach by most if not all legislatures does not by itself constitution-
ally incapacitate the courts.
The emphasis in Insurance Commissioner on the limited role of
the reviewing court should not obscure the fundamental importance
of the judicial function of "checking" arbitrary administrative action.
Well before the enactment of the Maryland Administrative Procedure
Act, the Court of Appeals had asserted in Hecht v. Crook3 that in
cases where the legislature had not provided for an appeal from an
administrative decision the courts still had "inherent power, through
the writ of mandamus, by injunction, or otherwise, to correct abuses of
discretion and arbitrary, illegal, capricious or unreasonable acts .... ,, 4
This inherent power of a court to set aside illegal, arbitrary and
capricious administrative action survives to this day and is still appli-
able in cases where no appeal from agency action is available under
section 255 of the Administrative Procedure Act or under any special
statutory provision.35 In most cases, the administrative illegality or
arbitrariness complained of involves a misconstruction by the agency
of the relevant statute. For example, in Hecht, it was alleged that
the Board of Trustees of the Employees' Retirement System of Balti-
more City had arbitrarily and illegally denied retirement benefits to
a former City Tax Court judge by wrongly construing the statutory
term "removed" to exclude instances where the employee failed to win
reappointment. Courts naturally view the judicial branch as the appro-
priate forum for resolving legal or constitutional questions, but the
inherent power of the courts to review administrative action is not
limited to matters of legality. Courts are also willing to exercise their
inherent powers to review factual findings for arbitrariness. In Heaps
v. Cobb,8 for example, the court overturned as arbitrary the finding
by the same Board involved in the Hecht case that the deceased had
died of a heart attack and not from an automobile accident. The
finding was arbitrary because it was without supporting evidence.
After reviewing the record, the court found "no evidence whatever
can determine whether rates are unreasonable) ; Monnier v. New York Cent. & H.R.R.,
175 N.Y. 281, 67 N.E. 569 (1903) (under statutory scheme, court could order carrier
to pay damages for overcharge) ; Janvrin v. Revere Water Co., 174 Mass. 514, 55 N.E.
381 (1899) (Holmes, C.J.) (court could determine whether a utility's rates were
"reasonable").
33. 184 Md. 271, 40 A.2d 673 (1945).
34. Id. at 280, 40 A.2d at 677.
35. Dickinson-Tidewater, Inc. v. Supervisor of Assessments, 273 Md. 245, 329
A.2d 18 (1974).
36. 185 Md. 372, 45 A.2d 73 (1945).
19761
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that Mr. Cobb's death was due to a 'heart attack.' ,,37 This review of
factual findings for arbitrariness has subsequently been expanded by
the Court of Appeals in a line of decisions culminating in Dickinson-
Tidewater, Inc. v. Supervisor of Assessments8 to require that there
be substantial evidence to support the administrative findings. "Thus,
where the scope of review is not specified in the statute, the substantial
evidence test has been followed." 9 While this expansion overlooks
the traditionally understood distinction between review of factual find-
ings for arbitrariness under a no evidence or no supporting evidence
standard and the more intensive forms of review for substantial evi-
dence or preponderance of the evidence under various administrative
procedure acts, it is appropriate in cases like Dickinson-Tidewater
where the Maryland legislature had established a right to appeal from
administrative orders of the Maryland Tax Court4" but had not speci-,
fled the standard for review either in the appeals statute itself or by
reference to the Administrative Procedure Act. The presence of a
statutory right to appeal makes it unnecessary for the courts to invoke
their inherent power to set aside illegal, arbitrary or capricious actions
37. Id. at 381, 45 A.2d at 77.
38. 273 Md. 245, 329 A.2d 18 (1974).
39. Id. at 256, 329 A.2d at 25.
40. The appeals statute used in Dickinson-Tidewater, Chapter 385 of the Acts of
1971, authorizing a direct appeal from final orders of the Tax Court to the Maryland
Court of Appeals, was recently declared unconstitutional in Shell Oil Co. v. Super-
visor of Assessments, 276 Md. 36, 343 A2d 521 (1975). The Court of Appeals held
that its jurisdiction and that of the Court of Special Appeals under article IV, section
1 of the Maryland Constitution was exclusively appellate and that the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction required a prior action by some judicial authority or the prior
exercise of judicial power. Since the Tax Court was an administrative agency and
not one of the courts enumerated in article IV, section 1 of the Maryland Constitution,
judicial review of its orders must initially take place in the circuit courts and the
Baltimore City Court. This rigid requirement that judicial review take place initially
in what are essentially trial courts may have an undesirable effect in some areas by
inserting an extra layer in the review process. Congress has often found it desirable
to channel judicial review of administrative decisions to the Courts of Appeals rather
than to the District Courts. If primarily legal questions are involved and if there
is no need or opportunity to take further testimony to supplement the administrative
record, direct judicial review in an "appellate" court is eminently sensible. Congress,
of course, has constitutional authority to create whatever lower federal courts it
chooses and to assign them whatever combination of appellate and original jurisdic-
tion Congress believes suitable, while the Maryland General Assembly is restricted
by article IV, section 1 of the Maryland Constitution (for the full text, see note 5
supra) to the establishment of "intermediate courts of appeal." Whether this constitu-
tional provision is too rigid in its preclusion of direct judicial review of administrative
decisions in the Court of Special Appeals or Court of Appeals is a question which
deserves serious consideration. For a discussion of this issue in the federal context
see Currie & Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action: Quest for
the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1975).
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in order to review the administrative order. While the narrow review
of factual findings under the no supporting evidence test originally
contemplated in Heaps may be satisfactory if limited to those few areas
where the legislature has not provided for an appeal or has acted
affirmatively to restrict judicial review of administrative action to the
constitutional minimum, it is not acceptable if extended to the findings
of such important agencies as the Tax Court.
The Heaps opinion contained important and oft-repeated dictum
that the legislature could not "divest the judicial branch of the govern-
ment of its inherent power to review actions of administrative boards
shown to be arbitrary, illegal or capricious, and to impair personal or
property rights.""' At least when personal or property rights are at
stake this judicial check is therefore available to aggrieved litigants
as a matter of constitutional right. This principle was recently trans-
formed into a holding in Criminal Injuries Compensation Board v.
Gould,42 where the court reversed an order of the Criminal Injuries
Compensation Board denying an award to a taxi driver abducted and
robbed while operating his taxi. The legislature had provided that the
Maryland Attorney General could obtain review of an award by the
Board which he or the Secretary of Public Safety and Correctional
Services considered improper but that "[t]here shall be no other judicial
review of any decision made or action taken by the Board . ...
Despite the legislature's rather clear intent to preclude judicial review,
the court still held that on an application for writ of mandamus or
certiorari it could reverse the Board's "arbitrary [and] illegal" decision
that was based on "[m]istaken interpretations of law."'44 The Board
had usurped the power of the courts by erroneously rejecting a determi-
nation of the Workmen's Compensation Commission that Gould was
an independent contractor and not an employee of the Yellow Cab
Company to whom the company was liable for job-related injuries and
had erroneously treated Gould's failure to prosecute vigorously his
Workmen's Compensation claim as a disqualifying failure to cooperate
"with all law enforcement agencies" as required by section 12 of the
Act.45 While the court recognized that section 10(a) of the Act pre-
cluded the "broad scope of judicial review" otherwise permitted in
appeals under the Administrative Procedure Act, the statute could only
preclude judicial review "so far as it might be within the legislative
41. 185 Md. at 379, 45 A.2d at 76.
42. 273 Md. 486, 331 A.2d 55 (1975).
43. MD. ANN. CODE art. 26A, § 10(a) (1973).
44. 273 Md. at 513, 521, 331 A.2d at 71, 76.
45. MD. ANN. CODE art. 26A, § 12(a) (1973).
46. 273 Md. at 499, 331 A.2d at 64.
19761
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power to do so"47 and could not "divest the courts of the inherent
power they possess to review and correct actions by an administrative
agency which are arbitrary, illegal, capricious or unreasonable."4
Despite the broad language in its opinion, the court in Gould
actually restricted its role to the determination of strictly legal ques-
tions. Gould is thus consistent with a long line of federal 49 and state"'
decisions where courts have utilized a variety of devices to resolve
constitutional and other legal challenges to administrative actions de-
spite legislative efforts to oust courts from their traditional role.
Courts have always viewed themselves as guardians of legality and the
ultimate deciders of all constitutional and legal questions. Consistent
with this approach, the Gould court showed no inclination to review
factual questions, or even mixed questions of law and fact involving
the application of a statutory term to undisputed facts. If the Board
had denied Gould's claim for compensation because it found that
Gould was not the victim of a crime but a participant in it and Gould
had claimed that this finding was not supported by substantial evidence
on the record as a whole, the Gould court plainly would not have re-
viewed the evidence because Gould limited its holding on the avail-
ability of judicial review to claimants whose eligibility as a crime
victim under section 5 of the Act had already been established. 1
Seemingly the court also would not have heard a claim that the Board's
findings were arbitrary because supported by no evidence whatsoever,
but that conclusion is less clear because of the Gould court's reliance
on Heaps. However, the court in Gould did determine that Gould
possessed a sufficient personal right once he met the eligibility require-
ments of a crime victim. At that point his claim for compensation
was transformed into a right protected by the court's inherent power
to review administrative actions for arbitrariness. It appears, there-
fore, that the factual question of a person's eligibility for compensa-
tion could constitutionally be left to the Board subject to no judicial
review whatsoever or at most to judicial review under an arbitrari-
ness/no evidence standard. Persons who claim to be crime victims
do not have a personal or property interest in the compensation fund
47. Id. at 500, 331 A.2d at 64.
48. Id. at 501, 331 A.2d at 65.
49. See, e.g., Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974) (statutory provision making
administrative decision on veterans' benefits final and conclusive on the courts does
not preclude constitutional challenge to eligibility limitation); Harmon v. Brucker,
355 U.S. 579 (1958) (finality accorded by statute to Army discharges does not pre-
clude review of discharge decision for "jurisdictional" errors).
50. See, e.g., Dauphin Deposit Trust Co. v. Myers, 388 Pa. 444, 130 A.2d 686
(1957); County Bd. of Educ. v. Parker, 242 Iowa 1, 45 N.W.2d 567 (1951) (dictum).
51. 273 Md. at 512, 331 A.2d at 71.
[VOL. 35
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as they have not contributed directly to it; and the legislature may
consider it desirable to preclude the entanglement of courts in the
factual contentions of disappointed claimants. Under this approach,
seemingly adopted in Gould, the scope of review is less when the legis-
lature acts affirmatively to restrict judicial review to the minimum
constitutionally permissible level than when the legislature simply does
not provide persons aggrieved by administrative action with an appeal
to the courts under the Administrative Procedure Act or some other
statute. In the latter instance of legislative silence, Dickinson-Tide-
water tells us that the scope of review is often not much different
than in appeals under the Administrative Procedure Act.
THE LIMITS ON THE JUDICIAL ROLE
Department of Natural Resources v. Linchester Sand & Gravel
Corp.53 is the culmination of a long line of Maryland cases that place
constitutional limits on the role of courts in checking executive or
administrative actions. The doctrinal underpinning for these decisions
is article 8 in the Declaration of Rights to the Maryland Constitution
of 1867 which provides, "[t] hat the Legislative, Executive and Judicial
Powers of Government ought to be forever separate and distinct from
each other; and no person exercising the functions of one of said
Departments shall assume or discharge the duties of any other." The
Court of Appeals has consistently interpreted this provision to pro-
hibit the legislature from allocating non-judicial functions to the courts,
but has had difficulty in formulating a comprehensive definition of
"non-judicial." In Board of Supervisors of Election v. Todd, 3 one
of the earliest and most cited cases, the court took a "you know it
when you see it" approach similar to Justice Stewart's approach to
defining hard-core pornography :54
It is only necessary in this case to say that counting the names
upon a petition, ascertaining whether the names appended thereto
are those of voters at the last election for Governor, and ordering
an election [on whether the county should be wet or dry] is not
a judicial function is a proposition that would seem to be too
plain to need argument to enforce it.55
Despite the mechanical nature of the task assigned to the circuit
courts by the statute successfully challenged in Todd, the Court of
52. 274 Md. 211, 334 A.2d 514 (1975).
53. 97 Md. 247, 54 A. 963 (1903).
54. "But I know it [hardcore pornography] when I see it, and the motion picture
involved in this case is not that." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
55. 97 Md. at 264, 54 A. at 965,
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Appeals evidently felt that the assignment was too political in nature.
The legislative allocation of more judgmental tasks to a court had
previously been upheld in McCrea v. Roberts,5 6 where the statute
required the circuit court on a contested application for a liquor
license to determine whether the nine persons who signed the cer-
tificate supporting the applicant were reputable freeholders who resided
in the neighborhood where the applicant proposed to conduct his
business. Applications were initially filed with the court clerk, who
referred them to the judge for decision only if they were contested.
In ruling on contested applications, the judge was expected, in the
court's words, to "exercise his judgment after hearing the evidence." 57
The Court of Appeals nevertheless concluded that these were ques-
tions of fact and law whose determination could appropriately be
assigned to the judiciary.
In Cromwell v. Jackson,58 the most important case in Maryland
on the limits of the judicial function prior to Linchester, the Court
of Appeals affirmed its holding in McCrea but held unconstitutional a
statute that allocated to a judge the further questions whether an appli-
cant for a liquor license was a "fit" person, whether the place for
which the license was applied for was a "proper" one, and whether
the applicant should receive one of the limited number of licenses
available in the county (one per 1500 inhabitants). The court's
primary objection to the legislation was the absence of any standard
or guide for determining answers to these questions. "The Act lays
down no rule to guide the Court as to who is a fit person for the
license .... Surely the Court, if acting judicially, cannot be governed
by the individual view of the judge . . . ."" Similarly, the Act con-
tained no standard for what is a proper neighborhood.
Is such a license to be allowed in a residential district, or in a
business district? Is it to be allowed where the majority of people
drink or do not drink; where there is a quiet neighborhood or
where persons will not object to the sale of alcoholic beverages ?6o
The court considered these to be "question[s] of public policy or
expediency" and not judicial questions.61
Surprisingly, the Cromwell court made no reference to the fact
that this absence of standards would make any similar legislative dele-
56. 89 Md. 238, 43 A. 39 (1899).
57. Id. at 252, 43 A. at 42.
58. 188 Md. 8, 52 A.2d 79 (1947).
59. Id. at 26, 52 A.2d at 88.
60. Id. at 27, 52 A.2d at 88.
61. Id. at 26, 52 A.2d at 88.
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gation to an administrative official constitutionally vulnerable. The
doctrine that delegation of licensing and other adjudicatory powers
to administrative agencies must be accompanied by adequate standards
was more vigorously enforced in the 1930's and 1940's than it is
today. Several years prior to Cromwell, the Court of Appeals had
declared unconstitutional for lack of adequate standards a public local
law that prohibited most forms of public entertainment without prior
payment to the Police Commissioner of a daily fee of between $5 and
$100.62 The law gave the Police Commissioner "uncontrolled discre-
tion" to set the fee in particular cases between these assigned limits,
a power which the court found could readily be used to prohibit enter-
tainments (such as dance halls) disfavored by the Commissioner and
which had been so used on at least one occasion in the past. 3 The
real defect in the statute declared unconstitutional in Cromwell was
that the legislature had not performed its law-making role by resolving
questions of public policy or expediency, but had invalidly delegated
law-making powers to an executive official. 4 Once the legislature has
done its job by promulgating adequate standards, it appears that the
questions of law and fact that arise in applying the statutory standards
to particular fact situations can be determined by a court as well as
by an administrative agency. Indeed, many of the early critics of
administrative agencies charged that the delegation of this adjudi-
catory task to licensing boards and other regulatory agencies was an
unconstitutional delegation of judicial power to the executive branch
of government, and unfairly subjected private interests to "adminis-
trative absolutism. '6 Today, however, we freely recognize the constitu-
tionality of administrative agencies performing quasi-judicial functions
subject to the check of judicial review.
This relationship between the adequacy of the statutory standards
and the nature of the task allocated to either judges or administrators
is again apparent in the Linchester case. The Maryland "Wetlands
Act,' 6 6 enacted in 1970, regulates the use of both private and state
wetlands. Section 9-306 requires any person who proposes to conduct
on any private wetlands any "activity" not authorized by rules or
regulations adopted by the Secretary of Natural Resources first to
62. Maryland Theatrical Corp. v. Brennan, 180 Md. 377, 24 A2d 911 (1942).
63. Id. at 383, 24 A.2d at 914-15.
64. See County Council v. Investors Funding Corp., 270 Md. 403, 441, 442, 312
A.2d 225, 246 (1973).
65. See REPORT OF THE SPEcIAL COMMITTEE ON ADmmNisTRATIvE LAW, 63 A.B.A.
REP. 331, 339, 340 (1938) (Roscoe Pound, Chairman).
66. MD. ANN. CODE, Nat. Res. Art., §§ 9-101 to -501 (1974).
19761
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
obtain from the Secretary a permit for the proposed work. A license
from the Board of Public Works is also required under section 9-302
if the proposed activity includes the dredging or filling of state wet-
lands. Following the enactment of the Wetlands Act, the Secretary,
by order, established wetland boundaries for each affected county, and
promulgated rules and regulations for each county which in identical
terms prohibited the dredging or filling of private wetlands without
a permit. The provisions in section VI of the Secretary's Regulations
on the subject of permits simply repeat verbatim the statutory standards
contained in section 9-306(b) of the statute: in granting, denying or
limiting any permit the Secretary or his designated hearing officer
"shall consider the effect of the proposed work with reference to the
public health and welfare, marine fisheries, shell fisheries, wildlife,
economic benefits, the protection of life and property from flood, hurri-
cane and any other natural disaster, and the public policy set forth in
the law."67 The statutory declaration of policy in section 9-102 is
equally open-ended. After extolling the importance of wetlands for
marine life, conservation and navigation, the legislature declared it
to be the "public policy of the state, taking into account varying ecologi-
cal, economic, developmental, recreational, and aesthetic values, to
preserve the wetlands and prevent their despoliation and destruction."6s
In early 1971 the Linchester Sand and Gravel Corporation
dredged a marsh on land owned by it to obtain fill for a man-made
dune designed to make the property more suitable for the construc-
tion of a home for its president and for access to the beach. The cor-
poration did not have a permit for this work and was promptly
ordered by the Department of Natural Resources to cease and desist
from its dredging and filling activity until it obtained a permit. When
Linchester's permit application was denied by the Secretary of the
Department of Natural Resources and by the departmental board of
review on an administrative appeal, it appealed to the circuit court
under the provisions of section 9-308 of the statute.69 Subsection (b)
67. Order Establishing Wetland Boundaries and Rules and Regulations, Maryland
Department of Natural Resources, Water Resources Administration, § VI at 5 (1973).
68. MD. ANN. CODE, Nat. Res. Art., § 9-102 (1974).
69. § 9-308. [Permit to conduct activity not permitted by rules and regulations] -
Judicial appeal from decision of board of review.
(a) Appeal procedure; time limitation. - Any party to the appeal to the board
of review pursuant to § 9-307 may appeal to the circuit court for the
county in which the land is located within 30 days after the decision of
the board of review.
(b) Appeal not subject to Administrative Procedure Act; de novo trial;
election of jury trial; no right of removal. - The appeal is not subject
to the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. The court shall
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of that section exempted the appeal from the provisions of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act and instructed the circuit court to "hear the case
de novo" with a jury trial available at the election of either party.
Subsection (c), on the other hand, authorized the circuit court to set
aside or modify a decision of the departmental board of review if the
decision was an unreasonable exercise of the police power. On Lin-
chester's appeal the circuit court judge first ruled under subsection
(c) that the board of review's denial of the permit did not constitute
an unreasonable exercise of the police power by confiscating Lin-
chester's property without just compensation. Linchester was not
deprived of all practical use of the land; and the president's home
could still be constructed on the land and access to the beach obtained,
although in a way somewhat different from that preferred by Lin-
chester. Linchester had elected a jury trial under subsection (b). The
judge interpreted that provision to require him to submit to the jury
the question whether the permit should be granted. He instructed the
jury by reading to it relevant excerpts from sections 9-102 and 9-306
of the Wetlands Act and formulated the issue as follows: "After
weighing the facts, considering the testimony and applying the law
as given to you by the court, should the requested permit be granted
or denied ?''70 The jury responded that the permit should be granted
and the court entered a judgment awarding the permit to Linchester.
The Department of Natural Resources then appealed to the Court of
Appeals and succeeded in convincing that court that the trial de
novo provisions in the Department's own statute unconstitutionally
"usurp[ed] the province of the administrative prerogative.""'
How did subsection 9-308(b) of the Wetlands Act assign a non-
judicial function to the circuit court? There is little doubt that the
broad statutory standards were adequate to uphold the delegation of
permit authority to the Department. Recent cases have been very
liberal in upholding broad delegations in areas related to the public
health, safety and general welfare so as to afford administrative officials
hear the case de novo. Either party may elect a jury trial. There is no
right of removal.
(c) Court may set aside or modify decision if unreasonable exercise of police
power. - If the court finds that the decision of the board of review
appealed from is an unreasonable exercise of police power, it may set
aside or modify the determination.
(d) Appeal to Court of Appeals. - Either party may appeal the decision of
the circuit court to the Court of Appeals.
MD. ANN. CODE, Nat Res. Art., § 9-308 (1974).




the necessary flexibility to implement the legislative will.7 2  In the
Wetlands Act the legislature had declared it to be the public policy
of this State to prevent the despoliation and destruction of wetlands.
The valuable functions performed by wetlands which are enumerated
in various sections of the statute give meaning to the terms "despolia-
tion" and "destruction." In particular, the permit section of the statute,
section 9-306, recognizes the importance of wetlands for the preserva-
tion of marine and shellfisheries and the protection of life and prop-
erty from flood, hurricane and other natural disasters; and the statu-
tory declaration of policy in section 9-102 further recognizes the
ability of wetlands to absorb silt and thus keep the channels of naviga-
tion open. Plainly, the propriety of granting or denying a permit
depends on the effect of the proposed activity covered by the permit
application on these valuable functions performed by wetlands. The
permit-issuing body should determine in this fashion whether the
proposed activity on private wetlands significantly despoils or destroys
the still remaining wetlands, private or state. In making this inquiry
the permit-issuing authority is instructed by section 9-102 to take
into account "varying ecological, economic, developmental, recrea-
tional, and aesthetic values." The board of review for the Department
of Natural Resources has interpreted this provision to mean that other
considerations may on occasion outweigh the State's policy to pre-
serve wetlands in their present form, at least where any damage to the
wetlands is slight." This balancing of interests is simply another way
to approach the question of what constitutes despoliation or destruction.
This inquiry accompanying the decision to grant or deny a permit
requires the decider to find the facts and apply the law to those facts.
The Secretary and the departmental board of review must do this
initially in deciding whether or not to issue a permit; and section
9-308(b) seemingly requires the circuit court or jury to do so again
on appeal by making independent findings of fact and substituting its
own judgment for that of the agency. The Linchester court believed
that this empaneling of circuit court judges and juries as the ultimate
wetland decision-makers created an intolerable situation because lay
judges and juries could substitute their determinations for those of
the Department's experts and thus reduce the agency's power as a
practical matter to a nullity.74 No doubt this is a powerful argument
against the wisdom of the legislation because the Department's experts
72. See, e.g., Pressman v. Barnes, 209 Md. 544, 121 A.2d 816 (1956).
73. Brief for Appellant at 8, Department of Natural Resources v. Linchester
Sand & Gravel Corp., 274 Md. 211, 334 A.2d 514 (1975).
74. 274 Md. at 228-29, 334 A.2d at 525.
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are seemingly better qualified to appraise the deleterious effects of the
proposed activity on wetlands than are lay judges or juries. The
Linchester court might also have mentioned the undesirability of
inconsistent decisions rendered by different judges and juries which
could be avoided if decision making were entrusted to a single adminis-
trative agency subject to limited judicial review.
These pragmatic arguments, however, do not address the consti-
tutional competence of a court to determine whether a permit should
issue. On this question the Linchester court did state that the Wetlands
Act required the Department, within the guidelines and standards
prescribed by the legislature, to "gather and sift evidence which is
directed ,both at present and future repercussions so as to take into
account the needs of the public in general. ' 75  The Court of Appeals
held that the judiciary could only review such a process under an
"arbitrary and capricious" type of scrutiny and could not perform
such a function itself.70 The court evidently believed that the judiciary
was not competent to perform the task because of the predictive nature
of the findings and the necessity of considering the needs of the public
and not just of the applicant. This task must have struck the Court
of Appeals as resembling too closely the highly discretionary tasks of
determining whether it was desirable or necessary to construct a par-
ticular highway or to appoint certain persons to a board of visitors
to supervise a county jail, a function held non-judicial in Beasley
v. Ridout.77
The presence of standards in the Wetlands Act, however, circum-
scribed the court's decisional role just as it did the agency's. In many
other areas courts are expected to make predictive determinations
based on both individual and societal needs. For example, the judicial
release provision of the Mental Hygiene Law requires a court (or a
jury, if requested by the patient) to determine whether a person civilly
committed to the Department of Mental Hygiene or a Veterans' Ad-
75. Id. at 228, 334 A.2d at 525.
76. It was not competent, therefore, for the court to empanel a jury and then
in effect instruct it to convert itself into an administrative body with authority,
as if original, to grant or deny a permit and in doing so determine whether there
was, or potentially could be a deleterious effect, as contemplated by the "wet-
lands statute," if Sharpley dredged and filled as he desired. This the Maryland
Constitution, which divides the powers of government into three separate branches,
neither to usurp the authority of the other, steps forth and forbids. On appeal,
§ 9-308(b) notwithstanding, the circuit court is constitutionally limited to an
assessment of whether that determination was based on evidence sufficiently sub-
stantial so that the permit denial was not "arbitrary and capricious."
Id. at 228, 334 A.2d at 525.
77. 94 Md. 641, 52 A. 61'(1902).
19761
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
ministration Hospital has a mental disorder "of such a nature that
for the protection of himself or others, the patient needs inpatient
medical care or treatment." ' Likewise, a common law court, operating
in the absence of legislation or of controlling precedent that has not
been overruled, takes into account predictive determinations of social
needs in fashioning rules of liability and immunity. 79 The Court of
Appeals itself has recognized in Deems v. Western Maryland Railway,80
that "[t]he determination of rights and liabilities according to status
and general circumstance . . . are the warp and woof of our judicial
system."'" In Deems, the court overruled precedent and recognized
the wife's cause of action for loss of consortium. Judicially fashioned
common law rules, based at least in part on a judicial evaluation of
social mores and social needs, do not violate the separation of powers
provision by usurping the function of the legislature.8 2 The undemo-
cratic nature of law-making by the judiciary serves to limit the occasion
for its use; and courts normally decide cases on the basis of precedent
or statute. The subordination of judge-made law to statutory law on
non-constitutional questions reflects the superior capacity of the legis-
lative branch to resolve questions of expediency and public policy in
the course of declaring the law.
Could not the legislature in exercising its law-making function
declare it to be the public policy of this state to preserve wetlands and
prevent their despoliation and destruction, and make it unlawful for
an owner of private wetlands to engage in any activity on his property
that significantly endangered the preservation of the wetlands and
threatened them with despoliation and destruction? The statute could
be enforced directly through criminal prosecutions in the courts, but its
potential vagueness and protective purpose might well influence the
legislature to authorize the circuit court where the land was located
to enjoin any such activity at the behest of the State's Attorney or of
any person adversely affected thereby. Putting aside the question
whether such a statute unconstitutionally takes private property with-
out just compensation, it is hard to conceive of a successful constitu-
tional challenge to this legislation which expands the law of nuisance
and entrusts enforcement responsibility directly with the judiciary
without assigning any intermediate adjudicatory role to an adminis-
trative agency. The function performed by the circuit courts under
the hypothetical statute would be no different than the function de-
78. MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 15(d) (2) (1972).
79. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 123 (1921).
80. 247 Md. 95, 231 A.2d 514 (1967).
81. Id. at 101, 231 A2d at 517.
82. Latz v. Latz, 10 Md. App. 720, 272 A.2d 435 (1971).
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clared unconstitutional in Linchester. Of course, the judiciary in the
hypothetical situation would not "usurp the province of the adminis-
trative prerogative," as the circuit court was reversed for doing in
Linchester. But it is hard to imagine how any "usurpation" that did
occur in Linchester could violate the constitutionally mandated separa-
tion of powers if the legislature were free to eliminate the agency's
role altogether.
The Department of Natural Resources in Linchester was exer-
cising quasi-judicial powers of fact-finding and law-applying within
limits established by the legislature. Such a role is permissible because
the Department only renders decisions subject to the check of judicial
review and does not itself enter judgments or decrees, a judicial func-
tion reserved exclusively to the courts under article IV of the Mary-
land Constitution."3 The very fact that the Department's function was
labeled quasi-judicial should indicate that it could be performed by a
court as well as by an administrative agency. Chief Judge Hammond
recognized this distinction in his seminal opinion in State Insurance
Commissioner v. Aational Bureau of Casualty Underwriters,4 when
he acknowledged that a court could constitutionally make independent
findings of fact and substitute its judgment for that of the agency in
reviewing licensing decisions of the Insurance Commissioner, but not
in reviewing the Commissioner's "legislative" or rule-making de-
cisions."5 The assumption of an independent decisional role by the
courts may turn the agency into a paper tiger and may make the invo-
cation of its procedures exercises in futility, but any such adverse
consequences reflect on the wisdom of the legislation and not on its
constitutionality. The very opposite may in fact occur; the agency
may be able to resolve speedily and informally the great mass of cases
and leave for the judicial process only those difficult cases warranting
more formal judicial proceedings.
The decision in Linchester which declared unconstitutional a
possibly unwise statutory provision discourages the General Assembly
from enacting comparable provisions in the future. The approach of
the Court of Appeals is consistent with its prior rulings and with case
law in the majority of states where the courts have refused, on separa-
tion of powers grounds, to issue or revoke licenses or permits them-
selves or even to find the facts or exercise independent judgment on
whether an administrator should have issued or revoked a license or
83. County Council v. Investors Funding Corp., 270 Md. 403, 428-35, 312 A.2d
225, 239-41 (1973).
84. 248 Md. 292, 236 A.2d 282 (1967).
85. Id. at 303-05, 236 A.2d at 288-89.
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permit. These tasks have been viewed as administrative or discre-
tionary and therefore non-judicial in nature."
Courts in California and a number of other states, however, have
held that if an administrative board revokes a license or otherwise
deprives a person of a vested right, due process and the separation of
powers require that the reviewing court itself (either at a trial de
novo or on the basis of the administrative record) find the facts and
exercise independent judgment on whether the license should be re-
voked." The California courts have even ruled that if judicial fact-
finding were not available, an administrative agency that revoked a
license or otherwise deprived a person of a vested right "would be
exercising the complete judicial power" in violation of the separa-
tion of powers porvision in the California Constitution." The Cali-
fornia approach assigns the court reviewing an administrative dis-
ciplinary proceeding the role of redetermining whether a licensee or
other respondent has violated the applicable standard of conduct. The
issues to be resolved are analogous to those at a criminal trial, but the
available sanctions are normally license suspension or revocation rather
than a fine or jail term. The California courts have so far refused to
extend the constitutional requirement of an independent judicial de-
termination to cases where an applicant seeks to obtain a vested right,
but have deferred in those cases to the "administrative expertise of the
agency" and have engaged in only limited judicial review of the agency's
"delicate task of determining whether the individual qualifies for the
sought right.""9 This distinction between seekers and holders of vested
rights has been criticized as illogical.90 An initial licensing decision
may involve the same types of issues that are involved in a typical dis-
ciplinary proceeding (e.g., did the applicant cheat on the qualifying
examination or engage in some other form of misconduct). Moreover,
disciplinary determinations often require a high level of expertise for
the delicate task of reviewing a licensee's conduct (e.g., whether a
doctor's performance fell below acceptable professional standards).
86. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE AcTioN 103-09 (1965)
(cases collected at 106 n.85) [hereinafter cited as JAFFE].
87. Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Ass'n, 11 Cal. 3d 28,
520 P.2d 29, 112 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1974); Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 481 P.2d 242,
93 Cal. Rptr. 234 (1971); Miller v. Texas Dep't of Pub. Safety, 375 S.W.2d 468,
rev'd on other grounds, 386 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
88. Laisne v. State Bd. of Optometry, 19 Cal. 2d 831, 835, 123 P.2d 457, 460 (1942).
89. Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 144, 481 P.2d 242, 252, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234,
244 (1971).
90. Id. at 161, 481 P.2d at 264, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 256 (Mosk, J., concurring);
Southern Calif. Jockey Club, Inc. v. California Horse Racing Bd., 36 Cal. 2d 167,
182, 223 P.2d 1, 9 (1950) (Traynor, J., concurring).
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Whatever need there is for an independent judicial determination is
potentially present in both situations.
The judicial initiative taken by the California courts has been
heavily criticized on policy grounds.91 The line of decisions culminat-
ing in Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Ass'n 2
and Bixby v. Pierno93 nevertheless seeks to protect licensees and other
holders of vested rights from harassment by subservient, biased or
captured administrative agencies that may look with disfavor on
maverick or unpopular members of the regulated trade or profession.
The device selected to protect the potential victims is the availability
of independent judicial fact-finding and law-applying before they could
be deprived of a vested right. The strongest objection to the Cali-
fornia decisions is that this initiative more properly should come from
the legislature than from the judiciary. 94 The legislature's superior
fact-gathering capacity better qualifies it to determine which licensees,
property owners or even applicants need the special safeguards of the
judicial process to protect them from administrative decisions liable
to be influenced by an agency's predilections or biases. The legisla-
ture can then fashion special procedures in response to ascertained
needs, while the courts can only enforce an across-the-board constitu-
tional rule. To have the facts found and the standards applied by a dis-
interested generalist judge (with or without the assistance of a jury)
rather than by a specialized and self-interested agency may be a real
advantage to the private citizen. Such arrangements may not always
be wise, but the legislature should be able to allocate ultimate adjudica-
tory responsibility to a court if it chooses to do so. If the legislature
supplies the standards and if the rights of an individual are at stake,
there is no reason why a court cannot adjudicate those rights. Courts
cannot determine whether highways should be built or elections held,
but they can determine a person's rights. The making of such determi-
nations is the very essence of judicial power. As stated by Judge
Markell:
Any question of law or fact which is made the basis of a legal
right, when a court is given jurisdiction to hear and determine
by a final judgment the existence of the legal right, is a judicial
question. This is true, regardless of whether the particular ques-
tion might or might not, by different legislation, be withdrawn
from judicial determination and submitted, as a "quasi-judicial"
91. See, e.g., Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 151-60, 481 P2d 242, 257-64, 93
Cal. Rptr. 234, 249-56 (1971) (Burke, J., concurring).
92. 11 Cal. 3d 28, 520 P.2d 29, 112 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1974).
93. 4 Cal. 3d 130, 481 P.2d 242, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234 (1971).
94. JAFFE, supra note 86, at 103.
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question, to an executive (i.e., "administrative") board for de-
cision, subject to the inherent power of judicial review or to
broader statutory review of "appeal. ' 95
A number of Maryland statutes seemingly recognize a greater
decisional role for the courts than the limited scope of review per-
missible after the Court of Appeals in Linchester declared section
9-308(b) of the Wetlands Act unconstitutional. Section 72 of article
56 authorizes the circuit court on an appeal from the comptroller's
suspension or revocation of a wholesaler's or retailer's cigarette license
to "determine the issue de novo, after considering the applicable pro-
visions of the law and all the evidence before it.""' Similarly, section
204(e) (2) of article 56 provides for a "trial de novo" on an appeal
from a decision of the State Roads Commission rejecting a permit
application for an outdoor advertising display. At trial, the court may
be required to redetermine whether the advertising display "will be so
illuminated as to create a hazard to one operating a motor vehicle
upon the State highway." However, a similar provision authorizing
the court to "hear the matter de novo, without a jury" on an appeal
from a licensing decision of the Board of Building, Savings and Loan
Commissioners was narrowly construed in County Federal Savings
& Loan Ass'n v. Equitable Savings & Loan Ass'n97 to accomplish no
more than to remove any restrictions on the admissibility of new evi-
dence at the court trial. The role of the court in reviewing the adminis-
trative decision was still limited in scope in accordance with the pro-
visions of sections 2 5 5 (g) (6) and (7) of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act. This technique of construing the appeal statute "in a way
that makes the review granted constitutional""8 was not invoked by
the court in Linchester, perhaps because the statutory reference to the
jury made clear the legislative intent to require independent fact-find-
ing on contested issues of fact.
Potentially the most important statute conferring independent
decisional power on a reviewing court is section 6-211(a) of the
Motor Vehicle Article, which grants a right of appeal to the circuit
court to any person denied a motor vehicle license or whose license has
been cancelled, refused, suspended or revoked by the Department of
Motor Vehicles, except in cases where the cancellation or revocation
95. Cromwell v. Jackson, 188 Md. 8, 37, 52 A2d 79, 93 (1947) (Markell, J.,
dissenting).
96. MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 72 (1972).
97. 261 Md. 246, 274 A.2d 363 (1971).
98. State Ins. Comm'r v. National Bureau of Cas. Underwriters, 248 Md. 292,
301, 236 A.2d 282, 287 (1967).
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is mandatory. 9 The section confers on the court jurisdiction to "take
testimony and examine into the facts of the case" and specifically in-
structs the court "to determine if the petitioner is entitled to a license
or is subject to suspension, refusal, cancellation, or revocation of license
under the provisions of this article." This statutory provision, which
is part of the former Uniform Motor Vehicle Operator's and Chauf-
feur's License Act, has received varying interpretations in different
jurisdictions'00 but it seemingly contemplates a trial de novo with an
independent judicial determination on both the facts and the law. The
statute was so interpreted by the Oregon Supreme Court in Stehle v.
State Department of Motor Vehicles,' where the court held that a
reviewing court could constitutionally determine whether a driver was
subject to license suspension for "habitual incompetent, reckless or
negligent" driving."°2 While the Oregon court recognized that some
licensing decisions might require the formulation of legislative policy
and thus be beyond the constitutional competence of a court, once the
legislature had established "specific statutory criteria" the "discre-
tion[ary]" process of determining whether those criteria have been
met "might well be assigned to the judiciary rather than to an adminis-
trative department.' 10 3
If the courts still take seriously the doctrine that the delegation
of adjudicatory authority to an administrative agency must be accom-
panied by adequate standards, it is hard to imagine an instance where
delegation to an agency could be upheld when the assignment of the
same task to a court would involve the court in the forbidden formula-
tion of legislative policy. The choice between court and agency is
-therefore largely left to the legislature. In most instances the legisla-
ture has wisely opted for limited judicial review of administrative
adjudications by so specifying in the statute which establishes the
agency 0 4 or by allowing judicial review to be governed by the limited
review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. Those pro-
visions are normally applicable to the decisions and orders of state
99. MD. ANN. CODE art. 662, § 6-211 (a) (1970).
100. See, e.g., Johnson v. Sanchez, 67 N.M. 41, 351 P.2d 449 (1960) (review limited
to a determination of whether there is substantial evidence to support the administra-
tive order); Bureau of Highway Safety v. Wright, 355 Pa. 307, 49 A.2d 783 (1946)
(statute provides for a trial de novo).
101. 229 Ore. 543, 368 P.2d 386 (1962).
102. Id. at 552, 368 P.2d at 391.
103. Id. at 551-52, 368 P.2d at 390.
104. See, e.g., the very limited appeal available from the licensing decisions of the




agencies not only where the legislature so specifies 05 but also in the
absence of any special statutory review provisions. 0 '
The legislature's capacity to distinguish between those situations
where limited judicial review suffices and those where an independent
judicial determination is desirable is reflected in the Wetlands Act
itself. The trial de novo provisions apply only to denials of permits
for proposed activities on private wetlands. The statute contains no
provision for judicial review of denials of applications for licenses to
dredge and fill state wetlands; and the limited review provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act should govern appeals from such denials.
The legislative scheme thus reflects an intent to afford greater protec-
tion to a person's use of his own property than to his use of state
property. If the legislature opts for more extensive judicial involve-
ment to protect private rights, the Maryland Court of Appeals should
be more cautious than it was in Linchester in concluding that such
statutes impose upon the judiciary prohibited non-judicial functions." 7
The legislature does not enjoy the same flexibility in allocating
rule-making powers to courts as it does in allocating adjudicatory
powers. Courts can only decide cases and controversies and issue judg-
ments that determine the rights of the parties thereto. They cannot
announce substantive rules except in the context of deciding a par-
ticular case. Such a decision affects non-parties only as a precedent.
Agencies, on the other hand, may exercise broader rule-making powers.
Despite occasional misgivings, courts have recognized that legislatures
can constitutionally delegate to executive officials the authority to
promulgate rules having general applicability and legal effect. Adminis-
trative officials engaged in rule-making are not exercising prohibited
legislative powers, but merely executing the legislative will by making
more definite the statutory standards. Thus agencies, unlike courts,
may formulate in separate rule-making proceedings prescriptive regu-
lations that are enforceable by fines or other sanctions against all per-
sons who violate their terms.
Rule making and adjudication both involve fact-determination
and the application of a statutory term to concrete fact patterns. If
an agency desires to prohibit a certain activity, it often has the choice
between enacting a rule prohibiting it generally or acting in particular
cases to order the cessation of the activity or to deny or revoke applica-
tions or licenses of persons who have engaged in the activity. Courts
105. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 525 (1971), on appeals from the licensing
decisions of the Architectural Registration Board.
106. Grosman v. Real Estate Comm'n, 267 Md. 259, 297 A.2d 257 (1972).
107. Cf. JAFFE, supra note 86, at 103.
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nevertheless properly refuse to substitute their judgment for that of
the agency on the desirability of a rule and limit themselves to an
arbitrariness and capriciousness type of review because a rule does not
determine private rights as does an adjudication. But when an execu-
tive official attempts to enforce an administrative rule against an
individual, then a court is competent to find the facts and to determine
whether the rule is applicable to those facts and whether the rule has
been violated. Courts perform that function every day when adminis-
trative rules are enforced through misdemeanor prosecutions just as
agencies perform it when enforcing their own rules in disciplinary pro-
ceedings. Of course, an enforcement court does not redetermine the
factual basis for the rule but limits its inquiry to the rule's rationality.
The validity of the rule in other circumstances does not affect the rights
of the parties before the court, and the court can do no more than
assure itself that the statute has been rationally applied in the case
before it. For this reason it would seem constitutional and perhaps
desirable for the enforcement court, if the defendant claims that the
enforcement of the rule in his case constitutes an unreasonable or un-
constitutional application of the statute, to determine those issues itself
rather than to defer to the agency. It was that type of issue which
the legislature seemingly allocated to the courts when it provided in
section 9-305 of the Wetlands Act that the circuit court should deter-
mine de novo with the aid of the jury whether the application of a
rule or regulation promulgated by the Secretary of the Department of
Natural Resources to private wetlands "restricts the use of his [the
landowner's] property so as to deprive him of its practical use and is
an unreasonable exercise of the police power so as to constitute a taking
of property without compensation."' 5 The issue formulated by the
statute seems eminently suitable for judicial resolution and does not
even require the court to engage in the predictive balancing functions
that may have been required if it were to decide under section 9-308(b)
whether a permit should be issued. If the court exempts the property
from the regulation, then the state has the option of attempting to
preserve the wetlands by instituting eminent domain proceedings. The
Court of Appeals in Linchester nevertheless declared section 9-305(a)
unconstitutional in a footnote without further comment.'0 9 The very
same issue, however, may be back before the courts when an affected
property owner seeks to enjoin the application of a private wetlands
108. MD. ANN. CODE, Nat. Res. Art., § 9-305(a) (1974).
109. It would seem that § 9-305(b), providing for an appeal, in the identical lan-
guage of § 9-308(b), from the administrative rules and regulations decisions by
the Secretary and review board, likewise would be constitutionally invalid for the
same reason. 274 Md. at 229 n.6, 334 A.2d at 525 n.6.
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regulation to his property on the grounds that the application consti-
tutes an uncompensated taking of his property. Does not the court
find the facts independently in that context? The case law on uncon-
stitutional takings indicates that the court is expected to make its own
independent findings on whether the challenged statute or zoning
regulation constitutes an unconstitutional taking of property depriv-
ing a landowner of all beneficial use of his property. While the prop-
erty owner must affirmatively demonstrate to the court that such is
the case, the taking issue is separate and distinct from the court's
limited review of the statute or zoning regulation for arbitrariness
and capriciousness. '
THE LIMITS ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE ROLE
The prior section of this article argues that the Maryland legisla-
ture enjoys considerable flexibility in allocating adjudicatory powers
(i.e., fact-finding and law-applying in particular cases) exclusively
to the courts, to administrative officials subject to the check of limited
judicial review, or to executive officials whose decisions are subject
to independent judicial scrutiny. So far attention has focused on the
constitutional limits on the role of the courts. Now the focus shifts
to the constitutional limits on the role of administrators. Are there
instances where it is constitutionally necessary that a court find the
facts and apply the law to those facts rather than simply review an
administrator's performance of those tasks?
The most obvious instance where a judicial trial is required is a
criminal proceeding. Courts have always provided the exclusive forum
for convicting and punishing criminal offenders. Long ago in Wong
Wing v. United States"' the Supreme Court held that the due process
clause in the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution re-
quires in the federal system a judicial trial to establish guilt before
punishment may be imposed for a crime. Article 21 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights also guarantees to the criminal defendant a
judicial proceeding with "a speedy trial" by an impartial jury, effec-
tively precluding an administrative trial. Difficulties arise, however,
in defining criminal punishment. Wong Wing treated as punishment
for a crime the imprisonment at hard labor and property confiscation
imposed by the Commissioner of Immigration on aliens found by him
110. See Bureau of Mines v. George's Creek Coal & Land Co., 272 Md. 143, 169-70,
321 A.2d 748, 761 (1974); Mayor & City Council v. Borinsky, 239 Md. 611, 622, 625,
212 A.2d 508, 514, 516 (1965). But see Frankel v. Mayor & City Council, 223 Md. 97,
103-04, 162 A.2d 447, 450-51 (1960).
111. 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
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to be present illegally in this country. While this classification is
surely sound, the limits of criminal punishment have been drawn quite
narrowly. It appears that related governmental impositions, such as
fines, 112 license revocations, 1 3 quarantines, and property destruction
(e.g., of putrid food)," 4 are not inherently punitive in nature but may
often serve regulatory purposes. The Wong Wing doctrine, therefore,
does not preclude an administrative agency from conducting a proceed-
ing that results in the imposition of these sanctions. To escape the puni-
tive label, however, the purpose of the sanctions must be to protect the
public and not to condemn or impose retribution on the wrongdoer."
Once criminal proceedings are eliminated, it is hard to argue that
the due process clause in the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution or the due process clause in Article 23 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights guarantees judicial fact-finding and
law-applying in other categories of cases. Administrators are capable
of conducting fair hearings; and most procedural safeguards neces-
sary for a fair hearing (e.g., cross-examination) can usually be afforded
by administrative agencies. The legislature can and usually does dele-
gate to agencies with important adjudicatory responsibilities the power
to issue compulsory process and to administer oaths. If fairness re-
quires, agencies can also observe the rules of evidence applicable in
judicial proceedings and can even employ independent hearing officers
that enjoy tenure in office. Administrative process is flexible and is
intended to vary from agency to agency and even from proceeding to
proceeding. While informality has generally been considered one of
the advantages of the administrative process, that process can be
judicialized if due process so requires. The Supreme Court has not
hesitated to enforce the commands of procedural due process"' and
as a result the conduct of many administrative hearings resembles all
too closely the conduct of a court trial.
This observation raises the basic question of how courts do differ
from agencies that exercise adjudicatory powers. The availability of
a jury is of course one difference. Courts also have an aura of dignity
that derives from their constitutional stature. In addition, judges
enjoy the independence of a constitutionally fixed tenure in office.
Most importantly, courts are considered the ultimate upholders of law
and guardians of legality. Agencies and administrators do not enjoy
112. Oceanic Steam Nav. Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909).
113. FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223 (1946).
114. North American Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
115. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
116. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole revocation hearing);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare termination hearing).
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any of these attributes. However, the constitutional status of courts
does not necessarily qualify them as superior fact-finders or adjudica-
tors. May not agencies do that job just as well, subject to judicial
review for legality. The legal realists have educated us on the elusive-
ness of facts and on the impossibility of accurately reconstructing after
the event what happened or what was in people's minds at a given point
in the past. Given the intractability of the fact-finding task, adminis-
trators may be better qualified to "find" the facts because, unlike judges,
they are not limited to party presentations but may affirmatively in-
vestigate to assure the completeness of the factual record.'1 7  But
adjudication (i.e., fact-finding and law-applying in particular cases)
also requires the decider to exercise judgment and discretion. Judges
and juries approach this task as disinterested, independent generalists,
while administrators, regardless of the procedural safeguards that
accompany their decision-making, are infected with a mission. The
statute establishing the agency has given it a job to do and a com-
bination of tools with which to accomplish it. It is not just that agen-
cies often engage in rule-making and enforcement activities as well as
in adjudication, but that each agency considers itself as having a task
to accomplish. This built-in bias does not preclude the agency from
proceeding fairly, but it does lead to the commonplace belief that a
person does not receive the 'same impartial trial from an agency that
he receives from a court. Since an agency is nevertheless capable of
adjudicating fairly, these differences between courts and agencies are
primarily policy considerations for the legislature to weigh in allocat-
ing business between courts and agencies; they do not directly affect
the constitutional competence of agencies to adjudicate.
Of course, specific constitutional provisions sometimes confer on
the parties to an adjudicatory proceeding the right to jury fact-finding
or to some other form of judicial process. Section 6 of article XV of
the Maryland Constitution provides a right to jury trial on all issues
of fact in civil proceedings where the amount in controversy exceeds
five hundred dollars, while section 40 of article III recognizes the
parties' right to a jury finding on just compensation in condemnation
cases. The seventh amendment to the United States Constitution also
recognizes a right to jury trial in civil cases, ,but that provision has
so far not been held applicable to state proceedings."" To the extent
that these constitutional provisions are applicable, they require a
117. FRANK, IF MEN WERE ANGELS 119-28 (1942).
118. See, e.g., Jacaponi v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 258 F. Supp. 880 (W.D. Pa.
1966), aft'd, 379 F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1054 (1968) ; Olesen
v. Trust Co., 245 F.2d 522 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 896 (1957).
[VOL 35
MARYLAND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
judicial proceeding where facts are found and law applied by a jury
and do not permit administrators to perform those functions subject
to limited judicial review. Administrative agencies have never been
delegated the authority to empanel juries, and surely when the consti-
tutional framers recognized the role of the civil jury they contemplated
a jury empaneled and supervised by a court exercising judicial powers.
The Maryland Constitution confers the judicial power of the
State on certain enumerated courts. The text of section 1 of article IV
on the Judiciary Department presently reads:
The Judicial power of this State shall be vested in a Court of
Appeals, and such intermediate courts of appeal, as shall be pro-
vided by law by the General Assembly, Circuit Courts, Orphans'
Courts, such Courts for the City of Baltimore, as are hereinafter
provided for, and a District Court; all said Courts shall be Courts
of Record, and each shall have a seal to be used in the authentica-
tion of all process issuing therefrom.
This section derives from a similar provision first found in section 1
of article IV of the constitution of 1851. Section 56 of the original
constitution of 1776 did no more than establish various courts with-
out expressly vesting the State's judicial power in the enumerated
courts. The present section 1 of article IV operates in conjunction
with the separation of powers article in the Declaration of Rights to
prevent the legislature from delegating judicial powers to executive
officials or administrative boards."' While this constitutional prin-
ciple is uniformly accepted, it leaves unresolved the more difficult
question of what constitutes a "judicial" power. Does fact-finding
and law-applying by a licensing board in a disciplinary proceeding
constitute the forbidden exercise of a judicial power, or is it only
"quasi-judicial" and therefore permissible? The prefix "quasi" is an
unfortunate one because it hints at the employment of a subterfuge or
fiction to circumvent a constitutional mandate. In actuality the phrase
"quasi-judicial" does no more than designate those adjudications of
individual rights that may constitutionally be entrusted to an adminis-
trative agency subject to limited judicial review. 20 For this reason, the
phrase "adjudicatory" powers is preferable to "quasi-judicial" powers,
The Maryland Court of Appeals has consistently upheld the con-
stitutionality of legislative delegations to administrators of the power
to find the facts and apply the law in particular cases. These tasks
119. Dal Maso v. Board of County Comm'rs, 182 Md. 200, 205, 34 A.2d 464,
466 (1943).
120. Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Ass'n, 11 CaL 3d 28,




require administrators to exercise judgment and discretion but do
not involve the exercise of judicial powers. Thus, prior to its recent
decision in Investors Funding, the Court of Appeals had upheld the
authority of the Workmen's Compensation Commission to "exercise
judgment and discretion" in applying the law to the facts in industrial
accident cases, 2 ' the authority of retirement boards to determine facts
and to make decisions on pension rights, 22 and the authority of the
Maryland Racing Commission to suspend a trainer's license upon the
basis of a factual determination that the trainer had violated a Com-
mission rule.123 These decisions did not supply any limiting principle
on the legislature's authority to delegate adjudicatory power to an
administrative agency. They did, however, indicate that the judicial
power is properly preserved in the courts if the courts retain their
inherent power to review administrative action for illegality and other
forms of arbitrariness and the legislative power is properly exercised
by the legislature if the statute provides some standards to guide the
administrators. As a result, "innumerable controversies .. . that tra-
ditionally fell within the scope of judicial inquiry" are today decided
by "boards of legislative creation."' 24 This phenomenon, of course, is
not limited to Maryland and is not entirely of recent vintage since
administrative powers to license, to impose a tax and to award a benefit
are as old as this country.125 The recent proliferation of administra-
tive agencies reflects the very practical fact that we cannot afford, in
these complex times, to resolve in the courtroom every one of the
"innumerable controversies" that arise between an individual and the
government, especially those controversies that grow out of regulatory
programs. Courts should be saved for more important functions; and
the legislature should retain broad discretion under the constitution to
delegate the adjudication of less important controversies or contro-
versies less deserving of a full judicial trial to administrative agencies
subject only to limited judicial review. Policy considerations, there-
fore, strongly support the results reached by the Court of Appeals in
the cases discussed above.
If the jury trial provisions are not applicable, when does due
process require independent judicial fact-finding and law-applying?
The federal courts have developed a doctrine that while most fact-
121. Solvuca v. Ryan & Reilly Co., 131 Md. 265, 284, 101 A. 710, 716 (1917).
122. Heaps v. Cobb, 185 Md. 372, 378-80, 45 A.2d 73, 76 (1945).
123. Maryland Racing Comnm'n v. McGee, 212 Md. 69, 128 A.2d 419 (1957).
124. Hecht v. Crook, 184 Md. 271, 277, 40 A.2d 673, 675 (1945).
125. 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 1.04, at 24 (1958) [hereinafter cited as




finding can be delegated to administrative agencies subject to limited
judicial review, there are categories of jurisdictional and constitu-
tional facts that must be found independently by the reviewing court.
Crowell v. Benson,1 6 the most important case in the history of the doc-
trine, arose under the Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act,'27 which established administrative tribunals for
handling the claims of injured workers. The Supreme Court upheld
the authority of Congress to establish such tribunals but insisted that
article III of the United States Constitution on the Judicial Power
required that the reviewing court not only determine all questions of
law but also find independently the "fundamental" or "jurisdictional"
facts of whether the claimant was an "employee" of the respondent and
whether the claimant's injury occurred on the navigable waters of the
United States.' s Twelve years prior to Crowell, the Supreme Court,
in an undistinguished and conclusory opinion by Justice McReynolds,
had held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
required a judicial tribunal of some sort to exercise its own independ-
ent judgment on the facts and the law when a public utility claimed
that a state rate order unconstitutionally confiscated its property. 2 9
Today the doctrine of constitutional or jurisdictional facts articu-
lated in the Crowell and Ben Avon cases is moribund at best, although
the Supreme Court has so far declined to issue the death certificate.
The Court has not invoked it since St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v.
United States,"30 and commentators have almost uniformly condemned
it.'' The occasional usefulness of the doctrine is nevertheless illus-
trated by Justice Brandeis' opinion for the Court in Ng Fung Ho v.
White."1 In that case the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of administrative proceedings for the deportation of aliens but added
that a person subject to a deportation order who claimed to be a
citizen was constitutionally entitled on habeas corpus to a judicial deter-
mination of his status. While Justice Brandeis' opinion employs the
language of jurisdictional fact by arguing that the executive has no
"jurisdiction" to deport a citizen and that independent judicial findings
of fact on citizenship are therefore necessary, he later vigorously dis-
sented from the application of the jurisdictional fact doctrine in CroweU
126. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
127. 44 Stat. 1424 (1927), now 33 U.S.C. §§ 901 to -50 (1975).
128. 285 U.S. at 54-65.
129. Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920).
130. 298 U.S. 38 (1936).
131. See, e.g., 4 DAVIs, supra note 125, § 29.08, at 161-62; JAFFE, supra note 86,
at 648-52.
132. 259U.S. 276 (1922).
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v. Benson."8 3 The real basis for his opinion in Ng Fung Ho was the
due process clause of the fifth amendment. Due process required
judicial rather than administrative fact-finding to determine Ng Fung
Ho's status because of the significance of the interests at stake.
To deport one who so claims to be a citizen, obviously de-
prives him of liberty. . . . It may result also in loss of both
property and life; or of all that makes life worth living. Against
the danger of such deprivation without the sanction afforded by
judicial proceedings, the Fifth Amendment affords protection in
its guarantee of due process of law.'
Justice Brandeis wrote these words against the background of Attor-
ney General Palmer's notorious campaign to rid the country of un-
desirable and radical aliens. The Attorney General's efforts often
rode roughshod over the rights of his victims, and quite significantly
Justice Brandeis adverted in his opinion to the "difference in security
of judicial over administrative action. '" 5
The issues raised in these Supreme Court cases have so far re-
ceived scant attention in Maryland. The Maryland Court of Appeals
has ruled that "due process does not necessarily mean judicial process"
and that the legislature may constitutionally substitute an administra-
tive procedure for the valuation of bank stock surrendered by dis-
senting minority shareholders for the judicial evaluation previously per-
formed by an equity court. 3 ' Such a reallocation of decision-making
competence does not confer judicial power On an administrative agency
and does not violate due process, so long as there is "an opportunity
for court review to pass on the legality ... of the award."'87
There are intimations, however, that judicial process may be
necessary when certain more vital interests are at stake. In Ellis v.
Ellis, 18 the Court of Special Appeals ruled that in child custody pro-
ceedings the Chancellor must make an "independent assessment" of
any evidence taken before a master3 9 and that the system of resorting
to masters in equity whose findings of fact are prima facie correct
''cannot supplant the ultimate role of judges in the judicial process
itself."'1 40 Strictly speaking, this requirement of judicial fact-finding
derives from the legislature's decision to make child custody proceed-
133. 285 U.S. at 85-88.
134. 259 U.S. at 284-85.
135. Id. at 285.
136. Burke v. Fidelity Trust Co., 202 Md. 178, 188, 96 A.2d 254, 260 (1953).
137. Id. at 189, 96 A.2d at 260.
138. 19 Md. App. 361, 311 A.2d 428 (1973).
139. Id. at 367, 311 A.2d at 431.
140. Id. at 365, 311 A.2d at 430.
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ings judicial proceedings. Former section 66(a) of article 16, now
section 3-602 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, confers
on the equity courts of this state jurisdiction in cases involving the
custody, guardianship, maintenance and support of a child. The actual
holding in Ellis is therefore rather narrow: "Litigants in a child
custody proceeding, as in all judicial proceedings, are entitled to have
their cause determined ultimately by a duly qualified judge of a court
of competent jurisdiction."'' But could the legislature constitutionally
divest equity courts of their original jurisdiction in child custody cases
and allocate those cases to an administrative agency subject to only
limited judicial review? The Maryland Court of Appeals has treated
the predecessor of the present jurisdictional statute as declaratory of
the pre-existing and inherent power of equity courts over the custody
of minors.'42 This long-standing practice of handling child custody
cases directly through the courts rather than through an administra-
tive process may form the basis for a contention that due process
requires judicial process, for historical practice is certainly one
factor to be used in determining what process is due. It would be sur-
prising at this late date for the legislature to establish a Maryland
Child Custody Administration and delegate to it the authority to deter-
mine the custody, guardianship, maintenance and support of children
subject to only limited judicial review. The interests at stake for both
parent and child are simply too vital to permit the substitution of
administrative for the traditional judicial process.
It would be more difficult to argue, however, that such legislation
violates article 8 of the Declaration of Rights on the separation of
powers by delegating a judicial function to an executive official.
Custody of the mentally ill has traditionally in this state been deter-
mined administratively, subject to limited judicial review by way of
habeas corpus. 14' This use of administrative process for the involun-
tary civil commitment of the mentally ill has never been considered
to violate the separation of powers. In addition, despite the importance
of the interest in personal liberty at stake, due process only requires
that the state establish the basis for commitment at a fair administra-
tive hearing and not necessarily at a judicial trial.144 This approach
to due process is understandable in light of the long history in Mary-
land and in at least ten other states of the administrative commitment
141. Id.
142. Burns v. Bines, 189 Md. 157, 162, 55 A.2d 487, 489 (1947); Barnard v.
Godfrey, 157 Md. 264, 267, 145 A. 614, 615 (1929).
143. MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, §§ 12 and 14 (1972).
144. See Developments in the Law - Civil Commitment of the Mentally I11, 87
HAv. L. REv. 1190, 1269-70 n.36 (1974).
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of the mentally ill. 4 ' The civilly committed patient in Maryland may
also petition at any time for judicial release; and the court must then,
subject to certain limitations on subsequent petitions, redetermine
whether the patient satisfies the criteria for civil commitment. 1 46
The adjudication of private rights is another area traditionally
reserved for the courts. Sir Edward Coke and other early champions
of the common law vigorously defended against the encroachments of
prerogative or executive courts the exclusive power of the common
law courts to resolve question of "meum and tuum" between private
subjects. 47 While the government has traditionally enjoyed wide
leeway in channeling non-criminal disputes between itself and its sub-
jects into various administrative or non-judicial forums, disputes be-
tween private citizens that may lead to an award of money damages have
traditionally been left to the courts for resolution with the aid of a jury.
Workmen's Compensation Acts provided an early exception in
Maryland and most other states to this generalization. The Court of
Appeals, however, has encountered little difficulty in upholding the
constitutionality of Maryland's Workmen's Compensation Act. In the
initial challenge to the Act, the court simply concluded that the State
Industrial Accident Commission was an administrative body exercis-
ing quasi-judicial powers and not a court exercising judicial powers.
The Act was also construed to preserve the parties' constitutional right
to jury trial in civil proceedings because it provided for a jury trial
in the circuit court on appeals from orders of the Commission. 4 s
Subsequently, in Branch v. Indemnity Insurance Co.,1 49 the Court of
Appeals abandoned its interpretation that the Act preserved the parties'
145. Id.
146. The constitutionality of the present Maryland procedures for the civil com-
mitment of the mentally ill may potentially be affected by the Supreme Court's recent
holding that a pretrial detainee in a criminal case has a fourth amendment right to a
judicial determination of probable cause by a neutral and detached magistrate. The
prosecutor's determination that probable cause exists is not a sufficient basis for hold-
ing the defendant in custody pending trial because of the prosecutor's adversarial role
in law enforcement. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). While Gerstein is limited
to criminal defendants, it is hard to see how the interest in liberty of the civilly com-
mitted patient is any less vital than that of a criminal defendant and the role of the
Department of Mental Hygiene significantly less adversarial than that of a State's
Attorney. Even property interests presently receive greater due process protection
than the personal liberty of the mentally ill. In North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v.
Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975), the Court indicated that a judge must resolve
questions of factual and legal sufficiency before a pre-judgment writ of garnishment
is issued at the behest of a civil plaintiff.
147. C. BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF SIR
EDWARD COKE 314 (1956).
148. Solvuca v. Ryan & Reilly Co., 131 Md. 265, 101 A. 710 (1917).
149. 156 Md. 482, 144 A. 696 (1929).
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right to jury trial when it held that the legislature could constitutionally
deny the employer a stay of a Commission award pending appeal be-
cause the jury trial on contested issues of fact available on appeal
was not "essential to the validity of the Workmen's Compensation Act
of Maryland."' ° The Branch court distinguished the new statutory
benefits available under the Act to injured and deceased workmen and
their families from the employees' common law cause of action for
negligence that had been abrogated by the Act. The legislature's
substitution of a program of statutory benefits for the common law
remedy, and its establishment of an informal administrative procedure
to handle claims, convinced the court "that the method prescribed by
the act for the determination of an applicant's right to its specified
benefits is essentially different from a civil proceeding in a court of
law to recover an 'amount in controversy.' ""' Because there was
therefore no "civil proceeding" with an "amount in controversy," the
parties did not have a constitutional right to a jury trial under section
6 of article XV of the Maryland Constitution. A claim for benefits
no more required a trial by jury than did a license revocation proceed-
ing or a tax assessment. The court did not view as determinative
and did not even mention the fact that any "benefit" awarded the
claimant would be paid out of the pocket of the employer or of its
insurance carrier if the employer had not previously made payments
into a State Fund.
In County Council v. Investors Funding Corp., the Court of
Appeals again faced the question of "the limits of adjudicatory powers
which can, within the Maryland Constitution, be conferred on an
administrative agency.'1 5 2 In 1972, the County Council for Mont-
gomery County enacted a Fair Landlord-Tenant Relations Act'53
that comprehensively regulated the apartment rental business and its
concomitant landlord-tenant relationships and activities in Montgomery
County. The Act required the licensing of all residental rental facilities
in the county and established two new agencies to administer its pro-
visions: The Office of Landlord-Tenant Affairs and the Commission
on Landlord-Tenant Affairs. The Executive Director of the Office of
Landlord-Tenant Affairs was delegated authority to issue, revoke,
deny or suspend licenses, to inspect licensed rental facilities, and to
investigate complaints of defective tenancies filed with him by either
150. Id. at 489, 144 A. at 698.
151. Id. at 486, 144 A. at 697.
152. 270 Md. 403, 428, 312 A2d 225, 239 (1973).
153. MONTGOMERY COUNTY CODE §§ 93A-1 to -46 (1965), as amended. This act




tenants or landlords. The Act broadly defined a "defective tenancy"
to mean "any condition in a rental facility which constitutes a viola-
tion of the terms of the lease or any provision of this chapter, or
constitutes a violation of any law, regulation or code."' 54 Adjudica-
tory powers were delegated to the Commission, which was comprised
of nine members appointed by the County Executive, three of whom
were to be selected from nominations made by organizations represent-
ing landlords, three from nominations made by organizations repre-
senting tenants, and three members from the public at large who were
neither landlords nor tenants. Persons aggrieved by the licensing de-
cisions of the Executive Director could appeal to the Commission,
which was required to make its own independent decision by issuing
its own "findings, opinion, and order in writing."' 55 The Commission
also adjudicated complaints of defective tenancies brought by the
Executive Director. Prior to bringing a complaint before the Com-
mission, the Executive Director was required to make an affirmative
finding that a violation or defective tenancy existed and to undertake
conciliation efforts. If the Commission found that a landlord or tenant
had caused a defective tenancy, it could order a variety of remedial
actions, including the termination of leases and the award of com-
pensatory damages not to exceed $1,000 to the affected landlord or
tenant for actual loss to person or property. If a landlord had caused
the defective tenancy, the Commission could also order repairs and
the return to tenants of security deposits and of any rental monies paid
and award reasonable expenditures for obtaining temporary substi-
tute rental housing. Monetary awards entered by the Commission
could be enforced by the landlord or tenant "in any court of competent
jurisdiction, and any such court is authorized to grant judgment for
such monies plus interest from the date of the award."'5 6 Finally, the
Act delegated to the Commission the authority to impose a civil penalty
not exceeding $1,000 for the violation of any provision of the Act,
including the causing of any defective tenancy.'57 Violations of Com-
mission orders were also a misdemeanor punishable in the criminal
courts by a fine of up to $1,000.158
154. MONTGOMERY COUNTY CODE § 93A-4(e) (1965), as amended, now § 29-1
(1972), as amended (Supp. 1974).
155. MONTGOMERY COUNTY CODE § 93A-24(c) (1965), as amended, now § 29-24(c)
(1972), as amended (Supp. 1974).
156. MONTGOMERY COUNTY CODE § 93A-43(c)(II) (1965), as amended, now
§ 29-43(c) (2) (1972).
157. MONTGOMERY COUNTY CODE § 93A-9(c) (II) (1965), as amended, now
§ 29-10(c) (2) (1972).
158. MONTGOMERY COUNTY CODE § 93A-17(a) (1965), as amended, now § 29-17(a)
(1972), as amended (Supp. 1974).
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The broad remedial powers delegated to the Commission pre-
sented the Court of Appeals a new and difficult problem in determin-
ing whether the Commission was exercising forbidden judiciail powers.
Executive officials have traditionally exercised administrative powers
to investigate violations of regulatory codes and to order violators to
cease and desist upon finding that a violation exists, but they have only
rarely been given the power to award compensatory damages or other-
wise to adjudicate private rights (e.g., by terminating leases). Even
workmen's compensation commissions only award benefits under a
predetermined statutory schedule and do not themselves place a dollar
value on the claimant's loss or otherwise determine the legal rights of
the parties. The Court of Appeals nevertheless upheld the conferral
of these powers on the Commission on Landlord-Tenant Affairs be-
cause they were only incidental to the Commission's legitimate regula-
tory powers. "[T]he Commission's function is not primarily to
decide questions of legal rights between private parties, but [that
function] is merely incidental, although reasonably necessary, to its
regulatory powers."'' 9 The Court of Appeals cited, in support of its
holding, Maryland workmen's compensation cases and a number of
out-of-state cases upholding administrative awards of compensatory
damages and other relief to the victims of racial discrimination.10°
159. 270 Md. at 441, 312 A.2d at 245-46.
160. State v. Bergeron, 290 Minn. 351, 187 N.W.2d 680 (1971) (administrative
order invalidating transfer of property in violation of state anti-discrimination
statutes); Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Franzaroli, 357 Mass.
112, 256 N.E.2d 311 (1970) (same) ; Jackson v. Concord Co., 54 N.J. 113, 253 A.2d
793 (1969) (compensatory damages for economic loss suffered by victim of housing
discrimination) ; Rody v. Hollis, 81 Wash. 2d 88, 500 P.2d 97 (1972) (compensatory
damages).
The Court of Appeals in Investors Funding did declare unconstitutional section
93A-9(c) of the Fair Landlord-Tenant Relations Act which authorized the Commis-
sion to impose a civil penalty not to exceed $1,000 for violation of any provision of the
Act. 270 Md. at 441-42, 312 A.2d at 246. The court held that the variable penalty
constituted an invalid delegation of legislative power because it gave the Commission
"unrestricted, unbridled discretion in fixing the amount of the penalty." Id. at 441,
312 A.2d at 246. Evidently judges can exercise unbridled discretion in fining but
administrators cannot. The court's holding is nevertheless rather limited because the
case law is running strongly in favor of the constitutionality of a variable administra-
tive fine and because the legislative body should be able to develop standards that
leave administrators with the necessary flexibility in fining without granting them
"unbridled" discretion. See City of Waukegan v. Pollution Control Bd., 57 Ill. 2d 170,
311 N.E.2d 146 (1974) (upholding administratively imposed variable civil penalty for
water pollution violations, where statute contained broad standards to guide the
administrators). Subsequent to the Investors Funding decision, the Court of Appeals
upheld the imposition of a $3,000 civil penalty by the Commissioner of Labor and
Industry. J.I. Hass Co. v. Department of Lic. & Reg., 275 Md. 321, 340 A.2d 255
(1975). Two judges concurred in the result solely on the grounds that the appellant
had not challenged the constitutionality of the administratively imposed civil penalty.
1976]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
The Court of Appeals did not indicate why the constitutionality
of conferring these remedial powers on an administrative agency was
dependent on the regulatory functions performed by the Commission
or precisely identify the regulatory powers that saved the delegation.
It would seem that the adjudicatory task performed by the Commis-
sion would be basically the same regardless of any additional regula-
tory functions performed by it. After finding that the landlord or
tenant caused a defective tenancy, the Commission would have to
determine whether it was an appropriate case in which to order the
termination of the lease or to award damages and, in the latter in-
stance, to determine the dollar amount of loss suffered. The Commis-
sion's regulatory role also appears to be a limited one; it does not
have the authority to determine itself appropriate standards of land-
lord and tenant behavior and to enforce those standards subject to
limited judicial review. Its role is primarily enforcement-oriented to
the exclusion of policy-making. In its licensing and complaint pro-
ceedings the Commission adjudicates violations of pre-existing stand-
ards that are found in housing codes, lease agreements 61 and in the
Act itself'62 and does not itself "regulate" by setting the standards
within guidelines established by the legislative body. No doubt the
Executive Director of the Office of Landlord-Tenant Affairs performs
administrative functions of licensing, inspection, investigation and
conciliation, but the nature of the Executive Director's job does not
seem relevant to the question whether the Maryland Constitution re-
quires that he bring his complaints before a court exercising judicial
power under section 1 of article IV rather than before the Commission.
The saving nature of the Commission's regulatory functions is
therefore not readily apparent but perhaps can be determined by analyz-
ing the contention in the dissenting opinion of Judge Barnes (joined
by Judge Smith) that the Act delegated to the Commission the
The statute instructed the Commissioner to give "due consideration to the appropriate-
ness of the penalty with respect to the size of the business of the employer being
charged, the gravity of the violation, the good faith of the employer, and the employer's
history of previous violations." MD. ANN. CODE art. 89, § 40 (f-x) (Supp. 1974).
161. Section 93A-26(e), of the 1972 Act, now MONTGOMERY COUNTY CODE
§ 29-26(e) (1972), requires that all leases contain the landlord's express warranty
of habitability and covenant to repair. The Commission can adjudicate violations
of that duty and of other covenants in the lease.
162. Sections 93A-26(b) and 93A-27(c) of the 1972 Act, now MONTGOMERY
COUNTY CODE § 29-26(b) and § 29-27(c) (1972), require that all leases entered into
after the effective date of the Act be offered for an initial term of two years, at the
tenant's option, unless a reasonable cause exists for offering an initial term for other
than two years. The Court of Appeals upheld the authority of the County Council to
change the common law in this manner, and in the manner described in note 161, supra.
270 Md. at 419, 312 A.2d at 234.
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authority to "fix the amounts of penalties and of damages resulting
from tortious action."' 63 The dissent does not cite any authority for
the proposition that causing a defective tenancy is a tort. Maryland
case law does hold, however, that a landlord is liable to his tenant
for injuries to person or property sustained by him as a result of
defects in the premises caused by the landlord's negligent breach of a
covenant to repair. 64 Likewise, a tenant who commits or permits waste
is liable to the landlord for actual damages suffered by the property.'65
A tenant is also liable to his landlord for damages caused by the breach
of his covenant to surrender possession of the premises at the expira-
tion of his tenancy in as good a condition as when he received posses-
sion. 66 There is thus a close correlation between conduct which causes
a defective tenancy and conduct that is tortious at common law. While
the concept of causing a defective tenancy may be the broader of the
two (housing code violations may cause defective tenancies but are not
necessarily torts), it is surely proper to characterize one of the func-
tions of the Commission as the fixing of damages (or the terminating
of leases) for tortious or wrongful conduct. Take the case, for
example, of the tenant who suffers a broken leg on some rickety stairs
that the landlord failed to repair. The issues in the case do not vary
depending on whether the case is heard in court or before the Com-
mission. Did the landlord breach a covenant to repair ?167 Did the
breach cause the tenant's injury, or did something else cause it, such
as the tenant's own fault? What are the tenant's damages? The
dissent in Investors Funding is therefore correct when it contends 65
that the cases upholding the Maryland Workmen's Compensation Act
are distinguishable because that law established a new program of
statutory benefits in lieu of a common law right to recover damages
for negligence and did not authorize the Commission to fix damages
resulting from tortious conduct.
The Fair Landlord-Tenant Relations Act, however, did not trans-
fer the adjudication of tort claims from the courts to a Commission.
If it did, it would most likely have been an unconstitutional delegation
of judicial power to an executive body. Additionally, it would have
163. 270 Md. at 462, 312 A.2d at 257.
164. See, e.g., McKenzie v. Egge, 207 Md. 1, 113 A.2d 95 (1955).
165. MD. ANN. CODE, Real Prop. Art., § 14-102(a) (1974).
166. Katz v. Williams, 239 Md. 355, 211 A.2d 723 (1965).
167. The landlord's breach of his covenant to repair "causes" a defective tenancy
under the Act in that it "constitutes a violation of the terms of the lease." MONT-
GOMERY COUNTY CODE § 93A-4(e) (1965), as amended, now § 29-1 (1972), as amended
(Supp. 1974).




deprived the parties of their right under the Maryland Constitution
to a trial by jury on factual issues in civil proceedings where the
amount in controversy exceeds five hundred dollars. 169 The Act did
not accomplish a transfer because the jurisdiction of the courts re-
mained unaffected; landlords and tenants retained whatever judicial
remedies were available to them. No additional rights were conferred
on landlords or tenants other than the right to file a complaint with
the Executive Director of the Office of Landlord-Tenant Affairs.
Certainly the Act did not recognize any new administrative cause of
action since it is not possible for an aggrieved tenant or landlord to
initiate Commission proceedings or to become a party thereto. The
Executive Director is the charging party who initiates and controls
the course of the proceedings. While the Executive Director has a
duty to investigate all complaints to determine whether a violation has
occurred, he has no duty to file charges with the Commission unless
he affirmatively finds that a violation has occurred and notifies the
Commission that the efforts at conciliation that he is required to
undertake have been unsuccessful. If the Executive Director refuses
to make the finding or notifies the Commission that his efforts at
conciliation have been successful, a dissatisfied complainant has no
remedy before the Commission. While the complainant might seek
judicial review of the Executive Director's decision, it is likely that
the courts will hold that the Director's charging decision, like that
of a State's Attorney, is a discretionary one subject to review for only
the grossest abuse. 170  Similarly, the Executive Director has broad
authority over the disposition of the case, either through settlement
with the responding party or through the relief he requests from the
Commission. Section 93A-43 authorizes the Commission to award
damages, terminate leases and grant other relief, but it very plainly
states that the Commission "may" (rather than shall) grant such
relief once it finds that a landlord or tenant has caused a defective ten-
ancy. The complaining tenant plainly does not have a right to claim
damages or other relief and is not even a party to the administrative
proceeding.
The regulatory function of the Commission now becomes appar-
ent. The Commission, as indicated by the purposes and policies enunci-
ated in the preamble of the Act, regulates or controls landlord-tenant
relations in the public interest at the behest of a public official and
169. The Attorney General has so ruled in advising the legislature that compulsory
arbitration on the issue of liability in common law tort claims without a de novo jury
trial on appeal was unconstitutional. 60 MD. ATT'y GEN. REP. & Op. 159 (1975).
170. Brack v. Wells, 184 Md. 86, 40 A.2d 319 (1944).
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does not adjudicate private claims. Incidental to its regulatory func-
tion, the Commission may in appropriate cases award damages or
other relief to an aggrieved landlord or tenant. From the perspective
of the respondent landlord or tenant, the impact of these remedies
resembles the impact of a monetary fine or license suspension or revo-
cation, sanctions which an administrative agency may constitutionally
impose.171 The award of compensatory damages or the termination of
leases differs from the other sanctions chiefly because a benefit is
directly transferred to a third person: That difference is not significant
enough within a regulatory framework to transform an otherwise
proper administrative proceeding into a lawsuit between private par-
ties that can only be tried in a court. Likewise, the administrative
proceeding initiated by the Executive Director before the Commission
is not transformed into a private suit with an amount in controversy;
it therefore does not qualify as a "civil [proceeding] . . . where the
amount in controversy exceeds the sum of five hundred dollars" where
the parties are entitled to a jury trial under section 6 of article XV
of the Maryland Constitution.1 72
The above analysis of the Investors Funding case supports the
result reached by the Court of Appeals but indicates that any transfer
of personal injury claims or other private litigation from the courts
to an agency raises quite different questions. Any transfer of adjudi-
catory power is unlikely to gain legislative acceptance unless the claim-
ant retains a right to recover damages either for negligence or under
conditions of strict liability specified by statute. The constitutionality
171. For a discussion of the constitutionality of an administratively imposed fine,
see note 160 supra.
172. A potentially troubling aspect of the Fair Landlord-Tenant Relations Act
not discussed by the Court of Appeals is the composition of the nine member Com-
mission on Landlord-Tenant Affairs. The part time, uncompensated lay members of
the Commission no doubt bring a sense of the neighborhood or community court to the
proceedings conducted by the Commission. Some commentators believe it necessary to
establish more neighborhood tribunals with informal procedures if people are to
retain their faith in the legal system. See FINAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN ASSEMBLY,
LAW AND A CHANGING SociETY II (June, 1975). On the other hand, attention has
recently focused on the qualifications and competence of both administrative and
judicial decision makers. The California Supreme Court has held that due process
requires that an attorney-judge and not a lay-judge preside at all criminal trials in-
volving charges which carry the possibility of a jail sentence. Gordon v. Justice
Court, 12 Cal. 3d 323, 525 P.2d 72, 115 Cal. Rptr. 632 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
938 (1975). The United States Supreme Court has agreed to hear a state case from
Kentucky raising similar issues under the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth
amendment. North v. Russell, 422 U.S. 1040 (1975) (probable jurisdiction noted).
While both Gordon and North involved criminal trials where due process standards
are very high, the requirement of fundamental fairness also applies to administra-
tive proceedings and administrative decision makers must be sufficiently competent to
find the facts and understand the applicable law.
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of legislation allocating the resolution of such claims exclusively to an
administrative agency subject to limited judicial review depends pri-
marily on the strength of the analogy to the Workmen's Compensation
Act. The adjudication of compensation claims by the Workmen's
Compensation Commission is constitutional because the legislature
has abolished entirely the employee's common law negligence claim
against his employer for work-related injuries and substituted in its
place a program of statutory benefits.1 7 8 The analogy is therefore a
strong one if the legislature chooses to abrogate completely a category
of tort claims based on fault and to substitute in its place a statutory
right to compensation for actual loss sustained. For example, the
legislature might abrogate medical malpractice claims based on fault,
and provide a statutory basis for recovery for persons who suffer
iatrogenic injuries in the course of medical treatment. Such claims
could just as well be determined administratively as judicially and
paid from a Physicians' Insurance Fund. But the legislature may on
policy grounds prefer an administrative scheme that more closely
resembles the present judicial handling of tort claims. The constitu-
tionality of such arrangements remains untested.
CONCLUSION
The legislature enjoys considerable flexibility under the Mary-
land Constitution in allocating adjudicatory powers between courts
and administrative agencies. There are constitutional limits on the
powers that courts and agencies may exercise, but within those limits
the legislature has the constitutional authority to determine the respec-
tive decisional roles of judges and administrators. In making those
determinations the legislature should weigh the competing policy con-
siderations that favor an administrative or a judicial forum. The
judiciary, in reviewing the constitutionality of particular legislative
choices, should respect whenever possible the legislative determina-
tion of the appropriate forum. Only the clearest demonstration that
a function assigned to the courts is a non-judicial one should pre-
vent the courts from performing it. Courts in Maryland and in other
jurisdictions have too readily held unconstitutional the assignment to
judges and juries of adjudicatory responsibilities in regulatory pro-
grams. While a court cannot formulate policy except in the context of
determining the rights of parties before it, it can find facts and apply
what law there is to those facts to determine the rights of individuals.
Likewise, if the legislature opts for an administrative forum, courts
173. Branch v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 156 Md. 482, 487, 144 A. 696, 697 (1928).
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retain their inherent power to review administrative action for illegality
and arbitrariness but should not otherwise interfere with the legisla-
tive choice except upon the clearest demonstration that the function
assigned to the agency is exclusively a judicial one. While agencies
cannot hear criminal cases or common law causes, courts should not
allow considerations of self-interest or tradition to block the develop-
ment of new institutions for resolving disputes between the govern-
ment and individuals or between private litigants. It should be re-
membered that even the great Lord Coke in his struggle to protect
the common law courts from encroachments by the prerogative courts
of the Stuart Kings blindly condemned the equity jurisdiction of the
Chancellor and refused to recognize that the common law contained
any defects requiring correction through the development of new
institutions.
